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Introduction
John Dewey on Philosophy and Childhood
Maughn Gregory and David Granger
John Dewey was not a philosopher of education in the now-traditional sense of a 
doctor of philosophy who examines educational ends, means, and controversies 
through the disciplinary lenses of epistemology, ethics, and political theory, or of 
agenda-driven schools such as existentialism, feminism, and critical theory. Rather, 
Dewey was both an educator and a philosopher, and he saw in each discipline re-
constructive possibilities for the other, famously characterizing “philosophy . . . as 
the general theory of education” (1985, p. 338). Dewey wanted each discipline to 
overcome its tendency to alienate knowledge and theory from experience and re-
construct itself as an enterprise aimed at personal and collective well-being. 
That disciplinary ethos is articulated in this issue of Education and Culture by 
authors who, like Dewey, often work at the intersection of philosophy and education 
and who have considered the significance of children and childhood for both dis-
ciplines.1 Two interrelated, paradigmatic figures emerge from these essays, neither 
of which can be found directly in Dewey’s writing, but neither of which, perhaps, 
would be articulated so widely or so compellingly today without him: the Child as 
Philosopher and the Philosopher as Child. 
The Philosopher as Child
Proponents of the figure of the Philosopher as Child see the practice of philosophy, 
ideally, as involving a turn toward childhood. They identify certain characteristics 
of childhood, such as impulsiveness, somatic awareness, and cultural naïveté, as 
important correctives to the personal and cultural habits of adulthood that im-
pede growth as they become hardened and nonadaptive—especially as these hab-
its have been manipulated by commercial, religious, and political forces.2 Thus, 
Eric Anthamatten observes in his essay that “Dewey lean[s] toward the child as the 
source and reminder to teachers, adults, and philosophy itself that the great truth 
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that must be pursued begins and ends with the ‘live creature,’ ‘fully present’”; and 
David Kennedy cites Dewey, telling us that “there is in the unformed activities of 
childhood and youth the possibilities of a better life for the community as well as 
for individuals” (1922, p. 99).
The authors in this issue consistently lament the fact that spontaneity, corpo-
reality, and naïveté have become associated almost exclusively with childhood, and 
habit, rationality, constraint and erudition with adulthood. This historical prejudice 
denigrates the former characteristics as obstacles to be overcome, while it reifies the 
latter in ways that make them seem absolute and irresistible. In his paper, Stefano 
Oliverio traces this mal-contrivance to Descartes’s construction of the scientific mind 
as different in kind from the mind of the child. He asserts that “the two main phe-
nomena at the dawning of modernity—the invention of childhood and the birth of 
science—can be read as two sides of the same coin.” Descartes’s emphasis on mecha-
nization and quantification in scientific method and understanding disregarded sci-
ence’s organic, qualitative, and desire-driven aspects, which became associated with 
immature thinking, that is, with that of women and children. More importantly, his 
ideal of rational thought—the cogito detached from its own physical embodiment 
and environment—condemned sensuality and instinct as necessarily irrational.
One consequence of this mal-contrivance is that “modern” education has 
aimed to move children away from their perceived irrationality, though as Athamat-
ten explains, “[i]t takes Herculean effort for the child [in school] to stifle the instinct 
to reach in order to know, to extract itself from the continuous and coordinated flow 
that is ‘life.’” Another consequence is that adults, even professional thinkers—even 
philosophers—are not expected to beware of the ossification of habit which obstructs 
new values available in present experience and nurture our own childish intelligence 
that might have discerned them. Another consequence is that science—and all the 
disciplines modeled on science (including, somehow, philosophy) is constantly on 
guard against the kinds of irrationality just described, and this very guardedness, 
as Dewey recognized, alienates work from value, inquiry from experience, and the 
adults we have become from the children we still are. These consequences are mu-
tually reinforcing. Thus, Dewey related the pseudo-problems that take up so much 
of the work of professional philosophers to the artificial problems that take up so 
much of the work of school children. Anthamatten describes this relationship as 
a “vicious cycle” in which professional philosophy and institutional education re-
inforce each other’s anesthetic tendencies: “Whole schools of thought emerge and 
ossify around disembodied notions of being, knowing, and doing, creating para-
digms and habitats that in turn reinforce these habits of disconnection and division.” 
As a “general theory of education,” philosophy is meant to assist and direct 
the human search for meaning and value, both inside and outside the academy. 
But in order to serve this purpose, it must retreat from the historical mal-contriv-
ance of human intelligence and personality and turn back toward childhood as a 
source of alterity that can interrupt, challenge, and potentially subvert the (after 
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all) resistible, “adult” given. Also, for some of the authors here, philosophy is both a 
professional practice undertaken within academic communities of discourse and a 
way of life—a practical art of living. The latter understanding dates back to ancient 
western and Asian schools of thought and widens both the scope of philosophy—to 
include, for example, practices of diet, art, and civic engagement—and the scope of 
philosophers—to include anyone engaged in self-conscious, self- and social better-
ment (Hadot, 1995, 2002). The Philosopher as Child is a normative figure for both 
realms, signifying aspects of childhood that adults, having been educated and ac-
culturated away from them, must find ways to reappropriate. The authors here fo-
cus on three of these aspects. 
The first aspect of childhood is sensuality or corporeality. The Philosopher 
as Child takes her intelligence to be coextensive with her entire body, especially as 
it is only with and through the body that she encounters the world. The Cartesian 
ideal of the disembodied mind and the ancient religious and philosophical tradi-
tions that inspired it have always existed alongside art, literature, and philosophy 
that celebrates the body, not merely as an object and vehicle of sensual beauty and 
pleasure, but of intelligence and even wisdom. The latter has been a plank of the 
naturalism shared among pragmatists and humanists. Dewey frequently argued 
against the dualism of body and mind or soul. In an early essay, he wrote that, 
“The body, through the nervous system, is not only a physiological, but a psycho-
physiological organism” (1969, p. 104): “The psychical is homogeneously related to 
the physiological. . . . Now this gives us but one alternative: either there is abso-
lutely no connection between the body and soul at any point whatever, or else the 
soul is, through the nerves, present to all the body. This means that the psychical is 
immanent in the physical. To deny this is to go back to the Cartesian position, and 
make a miracle of the whole matter” (p. 96). Dewey therefore saw children’s corpo-
reality—their unification of thinking and feeling, their acute sensitivity to physical 
sensation and the intensity of their interaction with the physical environment—as 
inseparable from their intelligence and their quickness to learn. As Anthamatten 
explains, “[i]t is the child that best epitomizes that the major organs of knowing are 
the hands and feet, and the process of learning and experiencing is better under-
stood by the metaphor of touch and movement, than by sight and stasis. The mind 
is a hand, the hand is a mind.” Dewey also practiced and advocated F. Matthias 
Alexander’s technique for increasing somatic awareness and reeducating somatic 
habits of breathing, posture, and movement. In this way he modeled the philoso-
pher’s return to the body as both a site of intrinsic wellbeing and as a mechanism 
of intelligent inquiry and philosophical insight. The new discipline of somaesthetics 
advanced by Richard Shusterman (1997, 2000, 2008) aims to facilitate this return 
by reconstructing philosophy as an embodied practice. As Anthamatten argues, 
“[p]erhaps the philosopher must create and maintain a certain theoretical distance 
from which to diagnose and understand the world. But the philosopher can never 
‘lose hold’ of the world, nor let the world lose hold of him.” 
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Another element of childhood recommended by our authors for philosophy 
is impulse, which connotes polymorphous desire, in opposition to the ancient and 
the modern Cartesian ideal of disinterested contemplation. David Kennedy refers 
us to one of Dewey’s early works on education, School and Society (1900), in which 
he analyzed four kinds of human instinct or impulse. These forces, Kennedy argues, 
should be taken as rich resources for learning and growth in childhood: the social 
or communicative instinct, the impulse to make and create, the drive to investi-
gate, and the expressive or artistic impulse. Following Dewey, Kennedy takes these 
impulses to be equally important for adult learning and growth. He traces their 
commendation by Dewey to the concept of “‘felt’ reason” developed by Romantic 
theorists like Wordsworth, Rousseau, and Schiller, who contended that the ratio-
nal is not opposed to, but rather continuous with, the sensual, and that impulses 
toward expression, creation, and play are as integral to human intelligence as are 
those toward form and order. Kennedy argues more generally that philosophy—
particularly as a practice of direct, mutual encounter and shared wonderment with 
others in a discourse community—summons these childish impulses and brings 
them into artful interplay, for adults as well as for children. 
These emphases on impulse and sensuality are, of course, central to the 
Peircean or Deweyan understanding of intelligence as the activity of a purposive 
organism inquiring, experimenting, collaborating, and otherwise working toward 
consummate experience in its current situation. It is only by going through that 
process that the organism becomes “educated,” that is, better able to resolve prob-
lems and enjoy new values in future situations. Dewey famously criticized what he 
called the “spectator theory” of knowing as a kind of disinterested apprehension 
or seeing, and he offered instead an “agent theory” of knowing as know-how that 
results from the intelligent pursuit of ends-in-view: a combination of reflective 
thinking and firsthand experiencing (MW2, 9, 12; LW4). For Dewey, it was not 
only that embodied, interested engagement with the world is necessary for knowl-
edge, but also that the value of knowledge is to facilitate that engagement. As David 
Granger puts it, “knowledge is largely subordinate to the direct qualitative meaning 
of things. . . . [I]ts value lies primarily outside of itself, in some external end. The 
intelligibility that it provides is meaning ‘for’ rather than meaning directly ‘of ’” 
(2006, p. 97). As Mark Dietrich Tschaepe’s essay illustrates, this model of learning 
at once reinstates qualitative experience and subjective purpose as integral to sci-
entific and philosophical method, and reinstates embodied, interested exploration 
as belonging to rationality. Further, as Oliverio claims, Dewey’s reinterpretation of 
the meaning of childhood is nothing less than a revolutionary assault on the Car-
tesian foundation of modernity.
A third aspect of childhood recommended for philosophy is naivete, which 
connotes freshness of perspective, discernment of novelty, and playfulness. Dewey 
was acutely aware of the fact that new experience is always mediated by meanings 
gathered from past experience, by means of language and other cultural systems 
Introduction: John Dewey on Philosophy and Childhood   5
Volume 28 (2)  2012
and by means of the deliberate manipulation of power interests: “[E]xperience is 
already overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of past genera-
tions and by-gone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, due to so-
phisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh 
naïve empirical material. . . . If we may for the moment call these materials preju-
dices . . . then philosophy is the critique of prejudices” (LW1: 40). Dewey highlights 
the chronological aspect of this process of acculturation: the past reaches into and 
shapes the present and future. It is in this sense that childhood necessarily comes to 
represent innocence or naivete. Of course, the meanings developed in a culture and 
expressed in its literature, political institutions, methods of agriculture, kinds of art, 
and so on both enrich and constrain the values experienced by people within the 
culture by training their habits of perception, desire, and behavior in certain ways. 
The benefits of acculturation are the “funded experience of the past” (Dewey, 1967, 
p. 42), that is, the values worked out by past generations and made accessible in the 
present. The liabilities, on the other hand, are the alternative values that become 
opportunity costs, as well as the phenomenon of the dead metaphor Nietzsche de-
scribed, where conventional norms no longer bring their associated values into ex-
perience (the rote prayer, the routinized flag salute, the all-too-familiar symphony). 
Dewey stressed the need for individuals and societies to find ways to win some 
distance from their habits in order to reevaluate and, as necessary, reconstruct them. 
However, prejudices are, by definition, blind spots. To critique our own cultural or 
personal prejudices would require us to observe them from a perspective that does 
not incorporate them. Yet Dewey believed this was ultimately possible, if challeng-
ing: “We cannot permanently divest ourselves of the intellectual habits we take on 
and wear when we assimilate the culture of our own time and place. . . . We cannot 
achieve recovery of primitive naïveté. But there is attainable a cultivated naïveté of 
eye, ear and thought, one that can be acquired only through the discipline of severe 
thought (Dewey 1967, p. 42).3 The “severe thought” Dewey discusses in this pas-
sage is the study of philosophy, broadly conceived, or rather, “the study, by means 
of philosophy, of life-experience” (p. 42). In fact, however, as Granger observes, 
this was not the only method Dewey offered for cultivating naïveté. Another was 
aesthetic experience, which, “by organizing experience around our perceptions of 
the qualitative uniqueness of some object or situation,” reveals “a new dimension 
of the meaning of the human encounter with the world” (2006, p. 104).4
A third way to cultivate spontaneity and freshness of perspective is described 
in detail in the articles in this issue. And while not found in Dewey, it seems an 
eminently Deweyan practice: dialogue with children. One important benefit for the 
philosopher who dialogues with children is epistemological. Insofar as philosophy 
involves constructing meaning from common and central human experience, and 
since so much of our experience is shared with the children in our lives, it would 
be irresponsible for us to inquire into the meaning of that experience without 
including their perspectives: the details they notice, the injustices they feel, the 
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imaginative possibilities they see (Gregory, 2002). As David Kennedy has argued 
elsewhere, because “[p]hilosophy is the discipline that emerges most directly from 
the fundamental human sense of wonder, and which turns on questioning both re-
ality and our knowledge of that reality,” it therefore provides a unique opportunity 
to “[open] the experience of childhood to reflection, both on the part of children 
and of adults” (1998, p. 36). 
Cultivated naïveté may also be described as an active sense of wonder, and 
adults who practice philosophy with children often find their own sense of wonder 
reawakening. This occurs not merely as intellectual curiosity, but rather as a more 
troubling sense of genuine doubt that signals a rupture in consciousness. This sec-
ond benefit to the philosopher who dialogues with children is that it may enable 
her to “decenter from adultism” in a way that provides access to the child, that is, to 
“the unconscious, irrational, undersocialized other whom the adult carries within 
himself. The child is the adult’s ‘earlier self,’ present in the latter both as a trace 
and a potential” (1998, pp. 32-33).5 The Philosopher as Child does not merely ac-
cess or imitate the playful thought of children, but instead senses the child within 
her, and she practices philosophy as a meeting between these various elements of 
her intelligence. Anthamatten traces Dewey’s “turn to the child as the model for 
praxis, possibility, and philosophy itself” to Nietzsche’s parable of the child as “the 
highest metamorphosis of the development of the spirit.” This metamorphosis or 
reconstruction is not, however, a retreat from adulthood, but an interaction, a dia-
logue, between the spontaneous and the stable, desire and detachment, feeling and 
semantic thought.
If Dewey had Romantic convictions that childhood offered an important 
model of the kinds of impulsivity, corporeality, and naïveté that adults must work 
to cultivate, the idea that adults might actually make themselves vulnerable to these 
shifts of consciousness by meeting children as equal partners in philosophical dia-
logue was beyond him. Nevertheless, Dewey saw philosophers, scientists, teachers, 
and school children, all, as agents of self-corrective growth, attempting to extract 
meaning from novel experience through intelligent thought, feeling, and action. 
In that regard, philosophers should know the serious playfulness that comes from 
direct engagement with the world. Children, for their part, should experience the 
exhilaration of having their immediate desires and concerns expanded and medi-
ated by disciplinary knowledge and know-how. They should, that is, become phi-
losophers.
The Child as Philosopher
Since Dewey’s time the figure of the Child as Philosopher has been variously articu-
lated and advocated in what has become the Philosophy for Children movement,6 
for which Dewey is widely considered a seminal figure. The person regarded as the 
movement’s founder, Matthew Lipman, decided to study philosophy while read-
ing Dewey as a young army recruit in 1944. Lipman eventually wrote his disserta-
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tion at Columbia University as an extension of Dewey’s aesthetics,7 which Dewey 
read and commended, and even began teaching at Columbia just a few years after 
Dewey’s death. Lipman began work on his first philosophical novel for children in 
1968 and left Columbia in 1972 to work on Philosophy for Children full-time at 
Montclair State College (now University), where he met and began a life-long part-
nership with philosopher of education Ann Margaret Sharp. Lipman and Sharp’s 
was the first systematic approach to precollege philosophy education, including a 
theorized curriculum and pedagogy, but other materials and approaches have since 
been developed in many parts of the world. Today, the International Council for 
Philosophical Inquiry with Children has members in over 60 countries.8 Lipman 
and Sharp’s program is the focus of most of the papers in this issue, and, impor-
tantly, most of these authors have engaged children philosophically.  
Much has been made of the influence of Dewey and other pragmatists on 
Philosophy for Children (Bleazby, 2011; Gregory, 2000; Johnson, 1995; Cam, 1994; 
Melville, 1990), something Lipman and Sharp both acknowledged and qualified 
(Lipman, 1994; Lipman and Sharp, 1978; Sharp, 1996, 1995a, 1995b, 1993). The fact 
remains, however, that Dewey himself did not describe children as philosophers 
and did not recommend philosophy as a subject for precollege education. In fact, 
though he wrote in broad terms about teaching for reflective thinking (1998), as 
Martha Nussbaum recently noted, Dewey “never addressed systematically the ques-
tion of how Socratic critical reasoning might be taught to children of various ages” 
(2010, p. 73). Nussbaum sees Lipman’s work as continuous with Dewey’s philoso-
phy of education and thinking about democracy, but as the essays in this volume 
amply demonstrate, the relationship of Dewey’s thought to children’s philosophi-
cal practice is a complicated one. While many of the aims, methods, and materi-
als that support that practice are consonant with some of Dewey’s most important 
and well-known writing on childhood, philosophy, and education, some are just 
as clearly instances of departure, or at least of “Deweyan way[s] of going beyond 
Dewey” (Striano, 2002, p. 63). 
Apart from the biographical considerations just mentioned, the major ways in 
which Dewey has informed the Philosophy for Children movement may be summa-
rized in terms of three much-debated issues at the heart of that movement: whether 
children can practice philosophy, whether (and why) they should be invited and 
guided to do so, and, assuming positive responses to the first two, how this should 
happen. Theorists in the movement have found important resources for addressing 
each of these issues in Dewey’s work.
Can Children Practice Philosophy?
Dewey’s account of intelligence as the ability of an organism to pursue ends-in-
view by changing the ways it interacts with its environment means that very young 
children—even infants and babies—already partake in intelligence. As he explains, 
“[T]endencies toward a reflective and truly logical activity are native to the mind, 
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and . . . show themselves at and early period, since they are demanded by outer 
conditions and stimulated by native curiosity. There is an innate disposition to 
draw inferences, and an inherent desire to experiment and test. . . . A baby, even 
at a comparatively early period, makes inferences in the way of expectations from 
what is observed” (1998, p. 83). In his contribution to this volume, Anthamatten 
draws our attention to one of Dewey’s earliest and most influential essays, “The 
Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896), in which he argued that the only way to 
explain learning from experience is to assume that the child having the experience 
is already an intelligent being pursuing value in its environment. The reaching of 
the child’s hand for the candle flame is not, to begin with, an arbitrary act which 
then becomes conditioned by the pain of the flame. Rather, it is an intelligent, pur-
posive act, which already involves the apprehension of certain meaning and value. 
The learning that occurs is the expansion of a former meaning and value of candle 
(beautiful light) to include a new one (pain). Thus, for Dewey, the child’s mind is 
neither a blank slate nor an engine of blind driving toward sensation. It is instead 
a circuit of purposeful, intelligent interaction with the world. Tschaepe relates this 
to children’s proto-scientific enthusiasm for exploring their physical environment 
and “formulating their own explanations, as scientists do, based upon observation 
and rudimentary experiment.” 
In addition to his early work in psychology, Dewey’s philosophy of education 
drew on his later work in social psychology. Dewey followed his Chicago colleague 
George Herbert Mead (1934) in emphasizing the importance of the learner’s inter-
action with her social environment, which enables her to internalize the discursive 
thinking that takes place between herself and others. As Nadia Kennedy notes in 
this issue, Lipman drew parallels between twentieth-century Soviet psychology—
especially Vygotsky and Davydov—and the pragmatist social psychology of Mead, 
Dewey, and Buchler.9 His conception of the classroom “community of philosophical 
inquiry” as a pedagogy of “cognitive cooperation with . . . peers and mentors” (1996, 
p. 45) is recognized as a ground-breaking application of social learning theory in 
education (Lim, 2004; Margolis, 1996). This theory has been used in Philosophy for 
Children in support of the claim that young children, by virtue of their participa-
tion in ordinary language communities, are already practiced in a host of complex 
cognitive operations, including abstract conceptualization, agreeing and disagree-
ing, asking for and providing reasons, offering explanations, giving examples and 
counterexamples, classifying, making distinctions and connections, reasoning by 
analogy, reasoning syllogistically, entertaining different perspectives, and self-cor-
recting (Kennedy, 1994). Importantly, this means that “the moves of the language 
game of philosophy . . . are implicit in the semantic and syntactical structures of 
language, and therefore always implicit among those who use language. If this is the 
case, then to the extent that children share a linguistic universe with adults, they 
share the capacity for at least some of the critical moves of philosophical dialogue, 
on some level” (Kennedy, 1999, pp. 350-351). Children’s philosophical capacity is 
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not only a matter of their cognitive ability, but also of their propensity for curiosity 
and wonder. Children, on the whole, seem more susceptible than most adults to 
genuine philosophical wonder, and in this issue Jennifer Bleazby attributes this in 
part to the strong imaginative capacities characteristic of childhood. Bleazby con-
structs a Deweyan account of the “intelligent imagination” and relates it to the way 
children “wonder about the seemingly mundane, ask questions of a philosophical 
nature, and are constantly searching for meaningfulness.” In accounting for chil-
dren’s imaginative propensities, Bleazby also indicates the chronological aspect of 
acculturation: that children encounter so many novel experiences before, and as 
they form, the schemata of concepts, and that, for the younger, “[t]heir thinking has 
. . . not been so moulded by dominant cultural beliefs and values.” 
Dewey is generally read, then, as supporting claims that young children are 
capable of wondering and looking for meaning, of thinking abstractly and logically, 
of conversing with others sympathetically, and of adjusting their own thinking and 
acting in accordance with what they learn by doing so—and that they do these things 
in some sense paradigmatically. The question remains, however, whether children 
can wonder, think, imagine, and inquire philosophically—that is, about philosophy. 
This is the question for which there is the least direct support in Dewey’s work; and 
yet, an argument can be made in support of a positive answer to this question by 
drawing on the way Dewey sometimes characterized the work of philosophy and 
the nature of philosophical judgment. One of Dewey’s most important insights was 
that philosophy addresses some of the meaning of our everyday, ordinary experi-
ences. Dewey understood “ethical,” “aesthetic,” “political,” and other philosophical 
categories to refer to dimensions of ordinary human experience, rather than remote 
intellectual or esoteric concerns segregated from it. In one of his best-known books, 
Art as Experience (1934), he argued that our experiences with the fine arts are merely 
instances of the kinds of aesthetic meaning that are available in all experience, that 
is, if we are awake to it.10 Also, as we become awake to the aesthetic dimension of 
our experience, we find not fixed aesthetic qualities, but rather aesthetic problems 
and possibilities unique to each situation. Moreover, the ways we respond to these 
problems and possibilities will help determine the aesthetic outcome: whether those 
situations become more or less beautiful, interesting, and emotionally connected 
to other situations. In this way, the study and practice of philosophy can help us to 
wake up to the ethical dimensions of our experience, the political, the logical, even 
the metaphysical, and help us to find ways of thinking, feeling and acting that make 
our experience more loving, more just, more reasonable, and so on.11
The only remaining question, then, is: does the ordinary experience of chil-
dren have these dimensions? Dewey did not address this question directly, though 
some of his writing on moral and aesthetic education assumes a positive answer. 
The pioneers of Philosophy for Children—Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, 
and Garreth Matthews (all of whom died within the last two years)—have dem-
onstrated incontrovertibly that children’s experience is just as replete with philo-
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sophical meaning as is that of adults (Lipman, 2003; Matthews, 1996, 1980; Sharp, 
2004). Children delight in the beauty and horror of the insect world. They express 
outrage at perceived playground injustices. They are fascinated by death and puzzle 
over cosmogony and theology. They are self-conscious about their own propensities 
for compassion and cruelty. Moreover, they are full of questions about all of these 
aspects of their experience and eager to discuss them, to hear and make up stories 
about them, and otherwise think through them. Children are eager not only to 
make sense of their experience, but also to make their experience more meaning-
ful, in part by opening up its philosophical meaning. This makes them philosophers 
in the truest sense. 
Should Children Practice Philosophy?
Dewey has been a major resource for those arguing that children not only can, 
but should, practice philosophy. Perhaps the reason given most often in support 
of this position is that practicing philosophy is an effective method of learning to 
think well, which Dewey urged as among the most important aims of education 
(1998). A leading figure in the critical thinking movement, Lipman repeatedly 
recommended philosophy as the most likely means of reaching this aim, as “the 
discipline par excellence for making sense of things and for preparing students to 
think in the more specific disciplines” (1996, p. xv). Proponents of Philosophy for 
Children have argued that practicing philosophy helps students learn to think well 
in a number of ways, such as making sound inferences and other reasoning moves 
(Cannon and Weinstein, 1985; Gratton, 2000; Lipman, 1984; Weinstein, 1988), as 
well as constructing and critiquing logical arguments (Slade, 1989; Splitter, 1988). 
More broadly, it has been argued that philosophy teaches children the nature of 
inquiry as an open-ended, self-corrective search for reasonable belief and value 
(Fisher, 2008; Lipman, 1991; Splitter and Sharp, 1995), along with strategies for 
inquiry such as identifying problems, formulating inquiry questions, construct-
ing and testing original hypotheses, and finding and analyzing relevant data (Da-
lin, 1983; Haynes and Haynes, 2000; Matsuoka, 2004). In addition, in this issue 
Tschaepe demonstrates how Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation “should 
be utilized as a self-empowering philosophical tool within the context of science 
education.” In all of these ways, philosophical inquiry presents a stark alternative 
to traditional pedagogy, which “presents students with facts as if they are settled, 
unproblematic and ready to be memorized,” and which stresses “efficiency and ac-
countability through government-mandated curriculums; the rigid alignment of 
stated learning outcomes with curriculum content, pedagogy and assessment, and 
usually involves high-stakes testing” (Bleazby).
As Bleazby explains here, however, reflective thinking is not reducible to logi-
cal operations, but, just as importantly, involves the imagination. And “[w]hile chil-
dren may have a natural propensity for imaginativeness, their thinking may also be 
more fanciful than imaginative at times . . . [and] need to be scaffolded.” Bleazby’s 
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essay draws broadly from Dewey’s work to helpfully distinguish six different roles 
he gave to imagination within the method of intelligence. These include conceiv-
ing alternative ends-in-view for problematic situations, suggesting means to reach 
them, evaluating means in terms of possible consequences, drawing on relevant 
past experience, making diverse perspectives accessible, and enabling social inter-
action. Given this centrality of imagination to reflective thought, Bleazby argues 
that rather than help students to “overcome or control their imaginations,” as Plato 
advised, “all schooling must cultivate the imagination as a basic, interdisciplin-
ary capability.” Bleazby’s thesis that Philosophy for Children is a likely method for 
fostering children’s “intelligent imagination” points to specific ways in which that 
program structures the work of philosophy: that it “involves questioning, wonder-
ing, criticizing and going beneath the surface of what is immediately given,” that it 
generates answers “which are likely to be contentious, open to criticism and lead to 
further questions,” that it relies heavily upon imaginative devices such as allegories, 
analogies, and thought experiments, encourages the consideration of alternative 
perspectives, and utilizes “the corrective potential of others [to] avoid thinking that 
is unrealistic and fanciful as opposed to imaginative.”
A second reason that children ought to be invited and guided to practice phi-
losophy is that, like all humans, they are “meaning-seeking creatures” (Armstrong, 
p. 2). As we observed above, the inexperience of younger children prompts them to 
wonder at every aspect of experience. Their love of stories indicates their strong urge 
to make meaning in experience, and the imaginative, off-kilter meanings they often 
make are an important reminder of the contingent nature of the adult meanings 
they are expected to appropriate. For adolescents, philosophical wonder is of a dif-
ferent kind. For one thing, they struggle with a problem contrary to that of young 
children: the varied and complex academic and cultural knowledge they have ac-
cumulated can be confusing and overwhelming, giving rise to questions about how 
it all fits together and what it all means (Suissa, 2008). And as adolescents approach 
decisions about careers, sexuality, and political engagement, existential questions 
about the meaning and purpose of their own lives become acute. As Jacob Needle-
man has observed, these are the kinds of questions that “are educated out of us 
by the time we reach so-called maturity” (1982, p. 85). Needleman, who created a 
high school philosophy program in the late 1970s, wrote of his students, “I wanted 
them to feel permitted to ask great questions…to feel the natural right to ask of the 
universe those simple, gut-level questions that are strongest in childhood, or which 
appear in moments of great disappointment or tragedy” (p. 85). 
In his essay, David Kennedy argues that young people’s philosophical ques-
tioning is intensified today, especially for those who consume vast amounts of 
commercial media, as they imbibe the restlessness and value-uncertainty that 
characterizes our postmodern cultural moment: “[W]e live in a historical era in 
which philosophical questions tend to become more and more visible as cultures 
and ideologies become increasingly inter-visible, and absolutisms of all kinds less 
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and less epistemologically viable [and] these doubts and questions are . . . commu-
nicated, directly or otherwise, to children from an early age and in a multitude of 
ways.” This scenario brings into sharp relief Bleazby’s argument that the capacity 
for independent thinking and personal autonomy—especially the use of intelligent 
imagination to envision ethical and political conditions alternative to the status quo 
and to the thoughts of powerful others—is particularly important “for marginal-
ized groups, including children and young people [whose] interests and experi-
ences may be those least reflected in dominant values and knowledge.” She further 
asserts that the philosophical concepts around which children’s inquiry typically 
centers—for example, truth, fairness, time, beauty, person—“are so fundamental 
to all our experiences and understandings, philosophical inquiry can provoke us 
to imaginatively reflect on every aspect of our lives.”
The primary value of philosophy, for children as for adults, is not that it makes 
us smarter or more successful. Rather, it offers us a method of inquiry and a his-
tory of ideas that can help us in our struggle to make sense of academic knowledge, 
of the world of our immediate and our mediated experience, and of our place in 
it. This use of philosophy is consistent with Dewey’s “Pedagogical Creed,” which 
stresses that “education . . . is a process of living and not a preparation for future 
living” (1897). It points to the intimate connection Dewey saw between philoso-
phy and education, which, as Oliverio reminds us, he traced to the “Socratic turn” 
of philosophy in ancient Athens. Dewey strongly identified with Socrates’s belief 
that the purpose of philosophy is not to win arguments but to improve life; and 
Dewey often described philosophy in this expansive sense, the sense in which it is 
co-extensive with education: “[P]hilosophy is love of wisdom; wisdom being not 
knowledge but knowledge-plus; knowledge turned to account in the instruction 
and guidance it may convey in piloting life through the storms and the shoals that 
beset life-experience as well as into such havens of consummatory experience as 
enrich our human life from time to time” (2008c, p. 389).
How Should Children Practice Philosophy?
Since Lipman and Sharp began their work on Philosophy for Children in the early 
1970s, many approaches to that work have been developed, both in and out of sync 
with their own. The authors in this issue of Education and Culture focus on two 
major elements of the Lipman and Sharp program—its method and its content—
along with ways of applying both across the curriculum. 
By far the most innovative aspect of the Lipman and Sharp program, and the 
most widely discussed in the research literature and in this volume, is the commu-
nity of philosophical inquiry (CPI; Lipman, et al., 1980). In this practice, students 
share a stimulus which provokes philosophical questions—such as a passage from 
one of Lipman’s philosophical novels—and construct an agenda for discussion out 
of questions they raise about the experience, depending on what they found most 
interesting or puzzling. They pursue these questions with each other in a dialogical 
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inquiry facilitated by a philosopher with pedagogical preparation or a teacher with 
philosophical preparation. In these dialogues, students explore their questions from 
many perspectives, consider and evaluate possible answers, and attempt to hone in 
on the most reasonable positions, while at the same time expanding their under-
standing of the topics’ complexities. David Kennedy describes the process this way: 
“In CPI each individual, thinking for herself and with others, becomes a practicing 
philosopher, and the group-as-a-whole shifts and self-corrects and develops as a 
philosophical and an ethical culture through the reconstruction and coordination 
of each individual’s philosophical beliefs.” This description is linked thematically 
to Bleazby’s explanation as to why empathetic imagination that entertains and cre-
atively integrates diverse perspectives is necessary for all inquiry, all dialogue and 
all human community. Indeed, the most important pedagogical innovation of CPI 
is the way it implements social learning theory. As Nadia Kennedy puts it in her 
paper, students in a CPI cultivate “individual dispositions and reflective habits that 
are internalizations of procedures that originate in the community.” She argues that 
this process exemplifies what Dewey meant by an “educative experience,” because 
“[t]he reconstruction of habit that ensues is marked by a broadened perspective, a 
shift of attitude, an increase in knowledge—in short, in enduring changes of a psy-
chological nature that follow from the acquisition of new meanings.” 
As many Philosophy for Children theorists have noted and as David Kennedy 
notes here, “the logic of CPI is Deweyan and Pragmatic, for it is based on problema-
tization in the interest of the enhancement of a lived situation.” This is significant 
for two reasons. First, it means that CPI teaches students a Deweyan “logic of in-
quiry,” where knowledge is seen as a new understanding or way of doing something 
that results from an effort of collaborative thinking and experimentation, and by a 
group of people who share an interest in the outcome. As Nadia Kennedy explains, 
“Lipman took from Dewey the notion that inquiry should begin with an experi-
ence . . . that can prompt students to encounter uncertainty and perplexity, and that 
motivates them to inquire into the problematic of a situation and to search for its 
resolution.” She goes on to say that Lipman shared Dewey’s aim of inquiry-based 
education, but saw “philosophical inquiry as a more promising way to achieve an 
inquiry-based educational model than the scientific method.” Tschaepe, however, 
maintains that science education could become inquiry based if students learned 
to practice Dewey’s method of scientific explanation, thus becoming “philosopher-
scientists.” 
Second, CPI follows not only Dewey’s logic of inquiry but also his phenom-
enology of inquiry, according to which (following Peirce) inquiry must begin with a 
problem, question, or doubt and must aim at a solution or resolution, both of which 
are genuinely felt—something in which the inquirer actually has a stake. This was 
also the basis of Dewey’s philosophy of education: children are continually chal-
lenged and provoked by natural and cultural phenomena that present new obstacles 
to the kinds of experiences they value, or present possibilities for novel kinds of 
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value. In such cases they must experiment with new ways of thinking, feeling, and 
acting to discover how to solve the problem or realize the new value quality. School 
curricula should help them to deal with opportunities for meaning-making in their 
current lives, not set up an artificial realm of scholastic experience segregated from 
the rest of life. The pedagogical justification for CPI is partly that it enables students 
to apply reflective thinking and interperspectival dialogue to situations in their 
own experience that have latent aesthetic, ethical, or other kinds of philosophical 
meaning, and to see what can be made of them.
The CPI has also been recommended as a pedagogy for democratic citizen-
ship, drawing on Dewey’s conception of social democracy as a community that 
employs the cooperative intelligence of its members to formulate and pursue its 
purposes—its collective ends-in-view (Gregory, 2005). Theorists inside and outside 
the Philosophy for Children movement have asserted that public education should 
initiate the young into the culture of collaborative deliberation we wish to foster 
and fortify (Nussbaum, 2010; Gutman, 1987); and Lipman saw “[c]ommunities of 
deliberative inquiry [as] microcosms of democracy not simply because they are self-
governing groups but because their modes of self-regulation and self-correcting can 
be carried over from the smaller groups to the more massive societies” (1998, p. 25). 
David Kennedy explains that some kind of CPI is necessary to all democratic prac-
tice not merely because of how it operationalizes critical thinking and the drawing 
out of diverse views on topics important to the group, as well as power sharing in 
management of the discourse, but also because it invokes parrhesia or frank truth 
telling as its primary mode of discourse. This introduces “negativity, interruption, 
problematization, interrogation, reinvention, self-correction, epistemological and 
moral suspense” as elements necessary for genuine inquiry into real controversies 
in any actual human community. 
In his article, David Kennedy points to another use of CPI that is a Deweyan 
and a Lipmanian way of going beyond both: as a mechanism not only for democratic 
meaning making, but for problem solving, power sharing and self-governance in 
schools. Kennedy sees Lipman’s CPI as “not just a pedagogical device, but the pro-
jection of an ideal speech community dedicated to a normative form of democratic 
practice.” Inevitably, some of the philosophical questions school children raise for 
discussion will be about their own political and ethical relationships—to one an-
other, to adults, and to the school and other institutions in which they participate. 
And as Bleazby observes, philosophy provokes and scaffolds students’ imagining 
alternatives to the status quo. In these ways the practice of CPI cultivates students’ 
political awareness; but Kennedy advocates it further as way of negotiating their 
needs and interests with those of the adults in their school settings. As he argues:
[B]ecause it is by definition a space of dialogue and interrogation, CIP in-
troduces both an element of interruption and even of implicit social danger 
into the adult-child collective we call school, which traditionally assumes 
the absolute epistemological authority of the adult. But it also introduces 
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a concrete, workable discourse model for negotiating that danger in the 
form of ongoing philosophical and social reconstruction, which includes 
the reconstruction of the adult-child relation. 
To the extent that CPI—especially in its political and moral aspects—brings children 
and adults together in inquiry-driven discourse and power sharing that changes the 
terms of the adult-child relationship beyond the discourse episodes, it is a radical 
practice without direct support in Dewey. 
The second major element of Philosophy for Children examined in this issue 
is the way it makes philosophy—as a range of certain kinds of questions and a rep-
ertoire of positions and systems of thought constructed in response to them—avail-
able for the consideration of young people. Again, this was not something Dewey 
envisioned, but it was undertaken under his influence. Lipman said of Dewey that 
“implicit in his writings are pedagogical guidelines which would be applicable to 
any curriculum, even to those that had not yet been invented, like educational phi-
losophy (i.e., philosophy functioning educationally, like Philosophy for Children)” 
(1994, p. 148). One of those guidelines was that “[a]nything which can be called a 
study, whether arithmetic, history, geography, or one of the natural sciences, must 
be derived from materials which at the outset fall within the scope of ordinary 
life-experience” (Dewey, 1967, p. 73). This gives educators the responsibility for 
“determining the range of [students’] past experience [and] finding activities that 
connect in vital ways with it” (p. 75). A second guideline is that “growth depends 
upon the presence of difficulty to be overcome by the exercise of intelligence” (p. 
79). This means that the curricula must highlight problems within the range of the 
students’ experience meaningful enough and challenging enough “that it arouses in 
the learner an active quest for information and for production of new ideas” (p. 79). 
Lipman’s original educational innovation was to conceive of the philosophi-
cal novel for children, one aspect of which would be to reconstruct the history of 
philosophy to be both accessible and relevant to children of various ages. Here, for 
example, is Lipman’s translation of Descartes’s First Meditation:
 Today Seth said, “Elfie hardly ever talks. Maybe she’s not for real!”
 That just shows how wrong he can be! Maybe I don’t talk much, but I think 
all the time. I even think when I sleep. I don’t have fancy dreams. I just think, 
when I’m asleep, about the same things I think about when I’m awake.
 Last night I woke up in the middle of the night and I said to myself, 
“Elfie, are you asleep?” I touched my eyes, and they were open, so I said, 
“No, I’m not asleep.” But that could be wrong. Maybe a person could sleep 
with her eyes open.
 Then I said to myself, “At this moment, am I thinking? I really wonder.”
 And I answered myself, “Dummy! If you can wonder, you must be 
thinking! And if you’re thinking then, no matter what Seth says, you’re 
for real.” (Lipman, 2004, pp. 4-5)
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Oliverio calls this Lipman’s “reterritorializing” of the history of philosophy into 
childhood experience, and offers in his paper this summary of the Deweyan peda-
gogy in Lipman’s fiction:
[I]n writing his stories Lipman moves from some ideas (e.g., beauty, jus-
tice) and from the treatment they received in the philosophical tradition; 
he then identifies experiential situations—suitable for children—in which 
those ideas can operate as possible tools to reconstruct and reorganize 
experience in order to add to meaning; finally, he embodies the different 
epistemic options (corresponding to different philosophical traditions) in 
different characters, who are engaged in a common inquiry, homologous 
to and modeling the inquiry which will take place in the classroom com-
munity of inquiry.
Lipman’s use of narrative rather than exposition enacted his own theory of 
the narrative structure of philosophical thinking (the drama of encountering and 
coping with perplexity) and of the philosophical text as one that provokes perplex-
ity in the reader and invites her into an active, dialogical relationship with it—one 
that is not merely informative but also transformative of the reader’s thinking (De 
Marzio, 2011). And Bleazby argues that narrative is particularly effective for engag-
ing children’s imaginative thinking in philosophical inquiry, including hypothetical 
and metaphorical thinking, and for creating further fictional scenarios. Oliverio 
draws on the work of Ann Sharp and Ronald Reed to explain how Lipman’s nar-
rative “translation” of the history of philosophy “makes it effective for the reorga-
nization of children’s experience [; and] broadens children’s ability to have mean-
ingful experiences.” Likewise, David Kennedy argues that Lipman’s philosophical 
novels answer Dewey’s called to close the gap between the psychological and the 
logical, the child and the curriculum, both by illuminating philosophical puzzles 
in children’s own experience and by “arous[ing] her innate logical dispositions.” 
Also, as Nadia Kennedy points out, “[t]he agenda of the Lipmanian group discus-
sion” around philosophical material in the novels “is guided by students’ interests, 
not by the logical organization of the subject matter.”
A third way of inviting children to practice philosophy discussed herein is 
engagement with philosophical content and method in traditional school subjects. 
As David Kennedy explains, “all school curriculum—each of the disciplines—has 
a philosophical dimension, and . . . this dimension is the very one that makes it 
most meaningful.” Nadia Kennedy argues, moreover, that “Lipman’s Philosophy for 
Children program [can be] seen as a framework for the design and performance of 
philosophical inquiry in all disciplines—something that he himself contemplated 
but never realized.” Her essay thus delineates specific ways in which philosophy 
can be brought into “a situation of encounter” with mathematics, an encounter 
that might provide a model for doing so across the disciplines: “[discipline-based] 
concept work; philosophical inquiry into the common, central and contestable 
concepts that are common to the disciplines; aesthetic inquiry . . . inquiry into the 
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benefits and the limitations of the [disciplinary] instrumentarium; ethical inquiry 
into the [cultural] uses of [the discipline]; and epistemological inquiry aimed at the 
reconstruction of mental beliefs or habits.”
Nadia Kennedy’s and Tschaepe’s essays demonstrate how engaging students 
in inquiry regarding the philosophy of a discipline at once helps them to appreciate 
the discipline’s intriguing philosophical dimensions and its relationship to other 
disciplines, as well as to better recognize the disciplinary dimensions of their own 
experiences. Doing so, Kennedy points out, avoids the miseducative ways in which 
subjects are typically taught: “ignoring students’ interests, a pedagogy based on rou-
tine, the dominance of trivial activities and tasks, [and] the increasing disconnection 
of the subject matter from students’ everyday knowledge and experience.” Tschaepe 
argues similarly that a philosophical approach to science education would help to 
deflate the authoritarian character of typical science education. What is more, Ken-
nedy argues that when philosophy is brought into dialogue with other disciplines, 
“each type of inquiry can add an extra depth to the other, and help us increase our 
awareness of what each can and cannot accomplish.” This pedagogical function of 
philosophy is also noted by Bleazby, who explains that philosophy uniquely “draws 
out the problematic, contentious, and thus imaginative, aspects of other disciplines. 
Other school subjects often take it for granted that truth, freewill, justice, democ-
racy and beauty exist, and they even make uncritical assumptions about what such 
concepts mean. In contrast, philosophy assumes that such concepts are conten-
tious, and much philosophical inquiry is devoted to exploring and defining them.” 
Dewey on Philosophy and Childhood
The fact remains, however, that Dewey himself did not describe children as phi-
losophers and did not recommend philosophy as a subject of precollege education. 
As Oliverio sees it, Dewey seemed not to appreciate “the wealth of educational op-
portunities embedded within the philosophical tradition,” or what Lipman termed 
“educational philosophy.” This supports David Kennedy’s claim that the two di-
mensions of Lipman’s program—“introducing philosophy as a subject matter in the 
elementary school through a series of philosophical novels written for children” 
and the “guided, structured, dialogical speech community . . . called ‘community 
of philosophical inquiry’”—were both “inaugural educational ideas.” Kennedy ob-
serves, further, that neither of these ideas occurred in the history of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century libertarian, anarchist, or socialist educational praxis.
The influence of Dewey on Philosophy for Children and the Deweyan char-
acter of its methods and materials have led many to wonder why Dewey himself did 
not inaugurate such a movement. Lipman actually addressed this question and he 
offered two answers. The first had to do with the nature of philosophy of education 
in Dewey’s time. Dewey’s primary educational interest was to introduce inquiry 
into schools, but philosophers, unlike scientists, had no interest in becoming in-
volved with schools: 
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There was no way [Dewey] could imagine the philosophers of education 
with whom he was familiar engaging in the experimentation and the or-
ganization of nuts and bolts observations that he deemed essential to the 
future of education. He was thoroughly familiar with the philosophers of 
education of his day, and he could see that they had relatively little interest 
in establishing a reciprocal theory/practice relationship with the schools. 
Their great love was philosophy in the abstract, as it dealt with highly theo-
retical themes relating to education. . . . No, the philosophers of education, 
Dewey must have concluded, neither would nor could involve their beau-
tiful discipline in the noisy turmoil of the schools. The science educators, 
on the other hand, he must have thought, knew exactly what was needed. 
(Lipman, 1994, pp. 147-148)
Perhaps Dewey meant something like this when he wrote that “the reconstruc-
tion of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and methods thus go hand in 
hand” (MW9: 341). In any case, and whether or not Lipman’s supposition is cor-
rect, Dewey’s critique of the aloofness of professional philosophers is well-known.
Second, Dewey’s famous phrase that philosophy could be understood as the 
general theory of education, meant, for Lipman, that philosophy was a theoretical 
discipline, one without a direct empirical, experimental practice. This tension in 
Dewey is something Lipman noticed as an undergraduate and never resolved. To-
ward the end of his life, he wrote,
Dewey minced no words, when he said that philosophy would be “the 
general theory of education.” He meant that it was to be the exception to 
the rule. In every other discipline there had to be an interpenetration of 
theory and practice, but in the case of philosophy, not so. . . . Nowhere in 
his writings does he refer to the practical use of philosophy in education. 
It was for him, I believe, unthinkable. (1994, p. 148)
This second reason is echoed by Oliverio, who explains Dewey’s passing over the 
possibility of educational philosophy by looking at the tasks Dewey set for the pro-
fession, one of which was to be a meta-level inquiry that mediates and critiques other 
fields of inquiry—tracing their remote origins and consequences—but is removed 
from the on-the-ground problem solving of each. 
A third reason offered by Oliverio is that the principal task Dewey set for 
philosophy—cultural criticism—requires a range of cultural understanding and 
experience that is beyond the experience of children. Thus, Dewey suggested that 
“From one point of view . . . the chief role of philosophy is to bring to consciousness, 
in an intellectualized form, or in the form of problems, the most important shocks 
and inherent troubles of complex and changing societies since these have to do with 
conflicts of value” (2008c, p. 30). James Campbell (1995) has consequently described 
“Dewey’s understanding of the cultural role of philosophical inquiry” as “a persistent 
attempt to uncover and evaluate, and replace if necessary the basic assumptions of 
culture” (p. 93). If, for Dewey, it was the philosopher’s task, for example, to critique 
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the way class prejudice distorted aesthetic experience and to recommend paying 
attention to the potential aesthetic meaning of ordinary experience, he would not, 
it seems, have taken the ordinary citizen who did so to be practicing philosophy. 
Oliverio characterizes Dewey’s view of philosophy as essentially Hegelian in that 
the meaning and value of historical philosophical positions and systems of thought 
is their continual reappropriation by contemporary philosophers who can connect 
them to the “constantly new emergences of culture”—again, a work of great sophis-
tication beyond the ken of children. 
Part of Dewey’s “Pedagogical Creed” (1897) was that “[e]xisting life is so com-
plex that the child cannot be brought into contact with it without either confusion 
or distraction.” If, as Dewey suggested, cultural critique requires the cultivation of 
naivete vis-à-vis one’s own cultural assumptions, it would seem, on the other hand, 
that it also requires sufficient enculturation to understand what one is critiquing 
and why. In this vein, Richard Rorty has argued that “[p]rimary and secondary 
education will always be a matter of familiarizing the young with what their elders 
take to be true, whether it is true or not. It is not, and never will be, the function 
of lower-level education to challenge the prevailing consensus about what is true. 
Socialization has to come before individuation, and education for freedom cannot 
begin before some constraints have been imposed” (p. 118).
David Kennedy situates Dewey within the broad historical movement that in-
cludes libertarian, anarchist, and progressive educational theorists, many of whom 
favored the notion of “integrated education” developed by Marx and Kropotkin. It 
emphasized children’s involvement in “interest-driven, hands-on experience associ-
ated with home industries and arts and crafts” which, it was believed, would “coun-
terbalance the abstract work that was identified as a major source of the dramatic 
irrelevance of the traditional school to children.” Kennedy then quotes Dewey on the 
necessity for such “childish inquiry”: “The child has not much instinct for abstract 
inquiry.” In contrast, Nadia Kennedy notes that “[p]hilosophical inquiry in Lipman’s 
usage is an encompassing term that signifies work related to reasoning and making 
judgments, conceptual analysis, and engagement in interpersonal communication 
and deliberation.” Perhaps it is fair to say that Lipman and Dewey both saw philoso-
phy as the discipline in which the “method of intelligence” was applied to “problems 
of men [sic].” But, for Dewey, that primarily meant addressing large-scale ethical, 
political, and cultural issues, while for Lipman it also meant addressing issues in 
personal experience and in a way that was within the ken of even young children. 
Making matters even more complicated, one of Dewey’s central educational 
principles was that “[t]he only way in which a person can reach ability to make ac-
curate definitions, penetrating classifications, and comprehensive generalizations 
is by thinking alertly and carefully on his own present level” (1998, p. 84). It follows 
from this that if the most important function of philosophy is cultural criticism, the 
only way young people can reach the ability to utilize that function on a national 
and global scale is to practice it on the scale of their own social milieu: the family, 
E&C   Education and Culture
20    Maughn Gregory and David Granger
the school, the neighborhood, and the vast world of media they inhabit. And to do 
this they must begin to take notice of the political, ethical, aesthetic dimensions of 
these domains, to notice problems and opportunities and to pursue experiences that 
seem worth having. They must “practice democracy” (Gregory, 2005), in Dewey’s 
novel articulation, as a mode of collective doubt-inquiry-growth within their own 
social sphere. In fact, Dewey recommended something close to this when he stated 
that “[f]ull education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of 
each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the so-
cial groups to which he belongs” (MW12: 199). 
Theorists in Philosophy for Children have, in fact, addressed the phenom-
enon of “The Child as [Social] Critic” (Sharp, 2009). It seems to fit squarely within 
Dewey’s vision of the school as a “form of community life” that continues the 
meanings and activities of the home life while reproducing, in a simplified form, 
the larger social life so that children’s “social consciousness” is expanded, and of 
the school as a site of meeting and mediation of various other social institutions. 
In this regard, he wrote, “It is idle to expect the schools to send out young men and 
women who will stand actively and aggressively for the cause of free intelligence 
in meeting social problems and attaining the goal of freedom unless the spirit of 
free intelligence pervades the organization, administration, studies, and methods 
of the school itself ” (LW11: 254).
Anthematten remarks on this notion that, “The child reminds us of that 
‘full presence’ from whence we began, and demands an education, a politics, and a 
philosophy that deepens that presence.” To invite children to practice philosophy 
as ethical, aesthetic, political, and cultural criticism is, as David Kennedy argues, 
not only to change the nature of adult-child discourse within schools. It is also to 
change what counts as epistemological and authoritative privilege in the adult-
child relationship, and in fact to change the school into a “miniature society of [an] 
adult-child collective.” Yet this is necessary for the emergence of both the Child as 
Philosopher and the Philosopher as Child. The two are mutually dependent in that 
their growth depends on their encounter in mutual practice. The possibility of that 
encounter is perhaps the most significant reconstructive possibility to emerge from 
the mutual encounter of the disciplines of education and philosophy that occupied 
so much of Dewey’s thought. 
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Notes
1. All but one of the articles published here were first presented at the 2011 American 
Philosophical Association Eastern Division Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., at a ses-
sion jointly sponsored by the John Dewey Society and the Institute for the Advancement of 
Philosophy for Children.
2. See, for example, David Granger’s discussion of Dewey’s critique of “the sociocultural 
conditions under which we have come to receive and respond to art,” which involve “a tacit 
endorsement of the intellectual dispositions of a class-based society . . . the rise of Western 
nationalism (furthering the desire to display the loot gathered in conquest of other nations) 
and the growth of modern capitalism (magnifying attitudes and practices of commodifica-
tion)” (2006, p. 110). 
3. It is significant that Dewey called for the cultivated naïveté of the eye and the ear as 
well as of thought; and it is not coincidental that Zen Buddhist philosophers also call for the 
cultivation of “beginner’s mind” as an aspect of wisdom (Suzuki, 2011), that they frequently 
describe this as a return to the child’s mind, and that among the contemplative practices they 
recommend for this cultivation are exercises in art (Loori, 2002).
4. Granger further explains: “Simply put, [the arts] can assist in reconstructing the ‘static 
filters’ of indurated habit.  In making the ordinary appear extra-ordinary, the arts make us 
aware of the limitations of those subconscious sense-making structures that actively condi-
tion the contents and contexts of everyday experience” (2006, p. 105).
5. Kennedy further explains: “What this does for the adult who listens for the voice 
of the child is that, through his relationship with the child, he rediscovers his own child-
hood by becoming conscious of the boundaries between instinct and repression that were 
a result of his own childhood formation. Through becoming aware of his own ‘child,’ he 
recovers himself on a higher level—through incorporating unconscious contents into con-
sciousness. . . . This in turn leads to the development of adults who experience a healthier, 
more creative relationship between conscious and unconscious elements of the self, and are 
therefore more capable of ‘inquiry and creative transformation’” (1998, pp. 34-35).
6. In current programmatic and research literature phrases such as, “Philosophy for 
Children,” “with Children and Adolescents,” “Philosophy in Schools,” and “Philosophy for 
Young People,” are used interchangeably to refer to any program that engages children in 
philosophical dialogue—as opposed, especially, to high school courses in which philosophy 
is studied as an academic subject.
7. It was later published as What Happens in Art. (1967). New York: Appleton Century 
Crofts.
8. See www.icpic.org, retrieved August 20, 2012.
9. “The conclusions I found in Vygotsky . . . showed me how to apply, specifically to 
the relationship between teaching and mental development, the views I had arrived at earlier 
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as a result of repeatedly dipping into Pierce and Dewey, as well as more sustained examina-
tions of Buchler” (Lipman, 1996, p. xiii).
10. Dewey writes, for instance, that “the work of art develops and accentuates what is 
characteristically valuable in things of everyday enjoyment. The art product . . . issues[s] 
from the latter, when the full meaning of ordinary experience is expressed. . . . A conception 
of fine art that sets out from its connection with discovered qualities of ordinary experience 
will be able to indicate the factors and forces that favor the normal development of common 
human activities into matters of artistic value” (1989, p. 17).
11. With regard to ethical inquiry, for instance, Lipman et al. insist that, “Students must 
not only be encouraged to express their beliefs . . . but to discuss and analyze them, con-
sidering the reasons for and against holding them, until they can arrive at reflective value 
judgments that are more firmly founded and defensible than their original preferences may 
have been” (1980, p. 47). 
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